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Abstract 
In this paper, I consider recent work which has drawn on the wealth of material in the Stanley 
Milgram Papers archive at Yale University to generate new insights into Milgram’s 
‘obedience’ experiments.  I will suggest that this work has begun to re-shape how we 
understand these experiments, and in particular will draw attention to the way in which audio 
recordings of the experiments point to the role of rhetoric in the experiments, and highlight 
hitherto unacknowledged procedural flexibilities in the standardized experimental 
protocols.  These points are illustrated using a revised transcription of one of Milgram’s case 
examples to further highlight the extent to which Milgram appears to have ‘smoothed over’ 
his transcript.  But I will also suggest that the capacity for qualitative analysis to be enriched 
by engagement with archival material should also ensure that the insights of poststructuralist 
and constructionist approaches are brought to bear on the archives themselves.  Drawing on 
Derrida’s Archive Fever, and on the literature on transcription practices in qualitative 
research, it is argued that as a source of data, we should apply the same cautious scepticism to 
archival material as we would with any other data.  When faced with a resource as rich and 
compelling as the Stanley Milgram Papers, the temptation may be to reify the materials held 
there as offering new and unvarnished ‘truths’ about what ‘really’ happened in the 
experiments.  By contrast, it will be suggested that as well as a resource, archives should be a 
topic for analysis. 
 Keywords:  archives, discourse, Milgram, obedience, transcription 
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Developing psychology’s archival sensibilities:  Re-visiting Milgram’s ‘obedience’ 
experiments. 
 
In the last five years or so, a burgeoning literature has arisen which uses the wealth of 
material held in the Stanley Milgram Papers archive at Yale University to shed light on what 
are usually referred to as the ‘obedience’ experiments1 (e.g. Gibson, 2013a, b, 2014; Haslam, 
Reicher, Millard & McDonald, 2015; Hollander, 2015; Millard, 2014; Nicholson, 2011; 
Perry, 2012, 2013; Russell, 2011, 2014a, b).  This sits alongside a smattering of earlier work 
(e.g. Modigliani & Rochat, 1995; Rochat & Modigliani, 1997) as an example of the way in 
which archival data can support research from a range of methodological and theoretical 
perspectives.  The present paper draws on my own research on Milgram’s archived data in 
order to highlight the value of using this particular archive to re-visit the conventional 
narrative that has crystallized around Milgram’s work, and by extension the virtues of 
archival data more broadly; but also to highlight a number of conceptual issues that are raised 
by the use of such data.  To do this, I will focus in particular on the way in which audio 
recordings of the ‘obedience’ experiments have been – and might be – transcribed; and I will 
also argue that a number of more general issues raised by the use of archival data have 
already been debated in relation to transcription.  Indeed, to the extent that the creation of a 
transcript can itself be understood as the creation of an archive, a number of conceptual issues 
raised by the use of archives can usefully be addressed by consideration of the literature on 
transcription. 
The starting point for my research was the observation that, despite the existence in 
the archives of hundreds of audio recordings of Milgram’s experimental sessions, there had 
been relatively few attempts to use these materials as the basis for qualitative analysis of what 
actually went on in the experiments (for an exception see Modigliani & Rochat, 1995).  My 
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aim was thus to use the methodological tools of rhetorical and discursive approaches to social 
psychology (Billig, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) to explore the nature of the experimental 
encounter (for fuller details of these analyses, see Gibson, 2013a, b, 2014; for a recent 
analysis using the related technique of conversation analysis, see Hollander, 2015).  In the 
present paper, I will outline an illustrative case analysis which highlights two of the key 
findings of my analyses:  (1) The rhetorical nature of the experimental encounters, and (2) the 
extent to which the experimenter in Milgram’s studies had to depart from the standardized 
procedure in his attempt to elicit ‘obedience’.  In doing so, the present paper will consider a 
number of issues raised by the use of archival data, as well as reflecting upon exactly what 
we might mean by ‘archival’ in the context of qualitative research.  My aim is thus to 
contribute to ongoing attempts to develop the historical sensibilities of psychology, with a 
focus on the fostering of what might be called a specifically archival sensibility.  In this 
respect, it is worth briefly noting some previous ways in which the term ‘archival data’ has 
been understood in qualitative research. 
 When qualitative researchers speak of ‘archival data’ they are most likely to be 
referring to data, collected by another researcher as part of a previous project, which has been 
stored in a physical or (more likely these days) an electronic archive, such as the UK Data 
Service (http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/), to which researchers funded by the UK Research 
Councils are expected to deposit their data on completion of their projects.  There is a fairly 
well-developed literature on the methodological and ethical issues associated with such data 
(e.g. Corti & Thompson, 2004; Fielding, 2004; Parry & Mauthner, 2004; Slavnic, 2013; 
Yardley, Watts, Pearson & Richardson, 2014), although it is fair to say that psychologists 
have not generally been at the forefront of these debates. 
 However, it could also be argued that qualitative research is by its very nature 
archival.  In transcribing an audio recording of, for example, an interview, a researcher is 
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creating an archive of the interview; an artifact that can be returned to time and again for 
repeated reading and re-analysis.  This alerts us to a distinction between archival data as 
something which is marked by the location of the data in a designated physical or electronic 
space, and a broader sense in which a recording and a transcription allows a conversation to 
be replayed in a different place at a later time.  To extend the meaning of archive this far may 
be too much for some; it might be suggested that the meaning of archive loses its specificity 
if we use it in such a way that it could conceivably be applied to all data.  However, this does 
alert us to some important conceptual issues concerning archival data, and these can be 
usefully outlined in relation to some much-discussed problems in the literature on 
transcription. 
 
Transcripts, archives and history 
Qualitative researchers have long highlighted the theory-laden nature of transcription 
(e.g. Ashmore & Reed, 2000; Bucholtz, 2000, 2007; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; Ochs, 1979), 
and while there remains a debate about the extent to which notions of transcription accuracy 
can be retained in light of the constructed nature of transcripts (Hammersley, 2010), it is clear 
that for many researchers what was once perhaps seen as a mundane technical issue is 
accorded greater significance given the ways in which the decisions one makes about 
transcription can reflect one’s pre-conceptions about the phenomena under investigation.  As 
a result, questions concerning what gets transcribed and how it is represented (Bucholtz, 
2000) are central to the production of a transcript.  Appeals to transcripts are thus never 
appeals to unmediated reality.  However, some authors have noted a distinction between 
transcripts and the audio or video records from which they are produced.  Of particular note, 
Ashmore, MacMillan and Brown (2004) identified what they termed tape fetishism.  They 
suggested that, in contrast to the widely-recognised nature of transcription as theory-laden, 
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there is little equivalent attention to recording practices.  Tape fetishism, they argue, involves 
the minimization or outright denial of the mediated nature of the relationship between 
recording and analysis.  Ashmore et al (2004, p. 351) suggest that the tape thus assumes the 
‘role of “found object” … to which the analyst can always return to settle analytic disputes’, 
and Ashmore and Reed (2000) argue that in conversation analysis, the distinction between 
transcript and tape can be summarized as the distinction between that-which-is-constructed 
(the transcript) and that-which-is-real (the tape).  It is in this sense that we can begin to see 
the way to a consideration of how this might be extended to a related fetishism for archives.  
There may be a temptation to see artifacts – whether recordings or documents – held in 
archives as existing independently of the process of analysis, and as such standing outside of 
the researcher’s engagement with the materials.  However, this would risk treating the 
archive as a straightforward reflection of some slice of reality, and would neglect important 
questions concerning the researcher’s engagement with it (what was selected for analysis? 
what was seen as less important? How did theoretical concerns influence these decisions?) as 
well as questions concerning the nature of the archive itself (what is included in the archive? 
what is left out?).  Instead, we should ensure that we see the archive-as-constructed, just as 
Ashmore and Reed argue that recordings should be seen as constructed. 
Given the relative scarcity of archival research in psychology, these points are worth 
emphasising.  However, it should be noted that there is nothing new in such observations for 
archival scholars.  Of particular note are Derrida’s influential reflections: 
the archive … is not only the place for stocking and for conserving an archivable 
content of the past which would exist in any case, such as, without the archive, one 
still believes it was or will have been.  No, the technical structure of the archiving 
archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming 
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into existence and in its relationship to the future.  The archivization produces as 
much as it records the event. 
(Derrida, 1995, p. 17, italics in original) 
To develop this point, it is worth turning to history, the discipline which has the most 
extensive experience with using archival data.  Within psychology, there have been a few 
attempts to explore the connections between qualitative methods and history, specifically in 
relation to the history of psychology itself (e.g. Bunn, 2011; Lamont, 2007), and more 
broadly the advocacy of a historical sensibility has formed a key part of the development of 
social constructionist and related approaches within the discipline (Gergen, 1973; Graumann 
& Gergen, 1996).  Nevertheless, in their recent work on the relationship between psychology 
and history, Tileagă and Byford (2014a; Byford & Tileagă, 2014) have pointed to the 
continuing difficulties presented by any attempt to work across these two disciplines.  
Whereas psychologists have tended to neglect context and specificity in pursuit of their aim 
of developing general explanations, historians typically foreground the specific; and insofar 
as they do not aim to produce general facts, their claims do not meet the epistemological 
threshold of mainstream psychology. 
At the core of this disjuncture between the two disciplines lies their differing 
methodological practices.  Whereas experimental psychologists are able to exercise control in 
the design of the contexts in which their data are generated, ‘Historians do not have that 
luxury: they deal with “data” that, because its locus is in the past, is always imperfect, 
incomplete, contingent on interpretation, mediated through sources’ (Byford & Tileagă, 
2014b, p. 353).  Thus, ‘the same historical material can produce multiple, competing 
interpretations and explanations, and there are no means of adjudicating between them, 
beyond the good old-fashioned scholarly debate’ (Byford & Tileagă, 2014, p. 350).  This may 
be unsatisfactory for many psychologists, for whom, assuming a particular model of the 
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natural sciences, the sine qua non of epistemological warrants is the experimentally-testable 
hypothesis.  However, it is notable that experimental practice in the natural sciences has itself 
consistently been shown to be much messier, more contingent and open to interpretation than 
is the case according to what Potter (1996) has termed the ‘storybook’ view of scientific 
practice, involving the discovery of neutral, objective truth through the application of 
impersonal methods.  Sociologists of scientific knowledge have highlighted the extent to 
which scientific practice can be understood as a fundamentally social practice (e.g. Gilbert & 
Mulkay, 1984; Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Lynch, 1993).  However, there have 
been relatively few attempts to apply these insights specifically to social scientific practice 
(although a healthy literature on standardized survey interviewing stands as a notable 
exception to this; see e.g. Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000; Maynard & Schaeffer, 2000), and 
virtually nothing which has focussed on psychology itself.  Wooffitt’s (2007; Wooffitt & 
Allistone, 2005, 2008) studies of parapsychology experiments are an exception in this 
respect, but the fact that these studies focus on a sub-discipline that would be considered by 
many psychologists as a fringe pursuit arguably makes it less likely that their insights will be 
considered more generally by experimentalists.  Indeed, it is notable that in the only major 
collection of work which is dedicated to exploring how social scientific research methods 
function interactionally (Drew, Raymond & Weinberg, 2006), not only is there no chapter on 
experimentation, but the topic does not even feature in the index. 
As ever we should be wary of conflating issues of method with issues or 
epistemology, but in contrast to many experimentalists (though not all, see Reicher, 1997), 
qualitative approaches informed by interpretative or constructionist perspectives arguably 
have greater potential to engage with the historical sensibility – with its concern for context, 
particularity, and interpretation – outlined by Tileagă and Byford.  One way in which this can 
be achieved is by using archival data – where they are available – to explore the practices of 
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psychology itself.  As Tileagă and Byford (2014b, p. 287) have argued, ‘It is perhaps time for 
psychologists to enter the archive, to learn more from the history of their own discipline’ (p. 
287).  The present analysis aims to do precisely that by reflecting on one such attempt to 
draw on archival material relating to one of the ‘classics’ of the discipline. 
 
The ‘obedience’ experiments and the Stanley Milgram Papers archive 
 Milgram’s (1963, 1965a, 1974) experiments in ‘obedience’ to authority continue to 
exert influence and excite interest amongst students and the general public alike.  They are 
regularly cited in discussions of issues such as abuse, terrorism and the Holocaust (e.g. Fiske, 
Harris & Cuddy, 2004; Lankford, 2009; Overy, 2014; Staub, 2014), and the recent 50
th
 
anniversary of Milgram’s (1963) first publication on the experiments was marked by a major 
conference (see http://www.obediencetoauthority.com) and a special edition of the Journal of 
Social Issues (Haslam, Miller & Reicher, 2014) dedicated to debating the experiments.  The 
official story of the experiments is well known.  Briefly, as reported by Milgram, the version 
of the experiment which is the focus of the present paper involved a naïve participant arriving 
at a laboratory, ostensibly to take part in a study of the effects of punishment on learning, and 
being greeted by an experimenter.  A second person arrived soon after, and while this person 
appeared to the first participant to be another naïve participant, he was in fact a confederate.  
The experimenter explained to both ‘participants’ that the study involved two roles – teacher 
and learner – and these roles were allocated using a rigged procedure so that the naïve 
participant always took the role of teacher, and the confederate was always the learner. 
The procedure required the ‘learner’ to answer questions on a memory test, which was 
to be delivered by the teacher.  Each time the learner made a mistake, the teacher was to 
administer what he thought was an electric shock as punishment.  These ‘shocks’ were 
administered using a machine which featured an array of switches ranging from 15 volts to 
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450 volts in 15 volt increments, and the punishments were to increase by one shock level 
with each incorrect answer.  The learner was strapped into a seat in an adjoining room, and 
had electrodes attached to his arm.  The teacher and experimenter then returned to the 
original room and the experiment began. 
Once the experiment was under way, it quickly became apparent that the learner – 
whose responses were provided according to a pre-determined schedule – was going to 
require electric shocks of an increasingly severe nature, and his pre-recorded protests became 
more vehement, including (at 150 volts) a demand to be released from the experiment.  When 
participants hesitated, or indicated that they did not wish to continue, the experimenter 
responded with a set of pre-scripted prods: 
Prod 1:  Please continue, or, Please go on. 
Prod 2:  The experiment requires that you continue. 
Prod 3:  It is absolutely essential that you continue. 
Prod 4:  You have no other choice, you must go on. 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 21, italics in original) 
These prods were to be used in order, and begun afresh for each new attempt at defiance.  
The experimenter also had two special prods available.  These could be used as required by 
the situation: 
Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please 
go on’ (ibid.) 
‘Whether the learner likes it or not, you must go on until he has learned all the word 
pairs correctly.  So please go on’ (ibid., p. 22). 
 
 Various aspects of Milgram’s account of his experiments have been challenged in 
recent years by scholars using the archived materials.  For example, Perry (2012, 2013) and 
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Nicholson (2011) have argued that archival evidence suggests that the ethical problems 
associated with Milgram’s work were even greater than is typically assumed; Russell (2011) 
has shown how, contrary to suggestions that he was surprised by his initial findings, Milgram 
carefully crafted his experiment to produce a sufficiently arresting set of findings; Millard 
(2014) has explored the way in which Milgram (1965b) constructed his film of the 
experiments in such a way as to represent a particular narrative of the studies; and in my own 
work (Gibson, 2013a, b, 2014, 2015) I have drawn attention to a number of issues around 
rhetoric and standardization in the experiments that are not readily foregrounded in the 
conventional narrative. 
 The archives feature a wealth of material from the ‘obedience’ experiments2, 
including questionnaires completed by participants, Milgram’s notebooks, and audio 
recordings of the experimental sessions themselves (see Kaplan, 1996, for an account of the 
acquisition and preparation of the materials).  For my purposes, it is the audio recordings that 
have been of most interest, for they allow us to hear the sessions unfolding, in many (though 
certainly not all) cases from before the arrival of the naïve participant to after they have left 
the laboratory.  Milgram (1974) himself made use of transcriptions of these recordings in his 
book Obedience to Authority, presenting them as part of short case study vignettes focussing 
on particular participants in two chapters entitled ‘Individuals confront authority’.   Despite 
the fact that they provide only a fleeting glimpse of the interaction between experimenter and 
participants, these transcripts are of particular interest as they have been used, albeit only in 
passing, to suggest that more appears to have been going on in the experiments than is 
typically assumed.  For example, Darley (1995, p. 130) noted that ‘the transcripts … revealed 
that the experimenter did not follow this instruction [to use only the six scripted] prods, and 
instead directly responded to what he took to be the implied question raised by the teacher.’  
In a slightly different vein, Reicher, Haslam and Rath (2008, p. 1321; see also Haslam & 
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Reicher, 2007) argue that ‘Film and transcript of the studies … show that, far from becoming 
morally disengaged and passive, participants were profoundly troubled by what they were 
doing and initiated long debates about the justification for continuing the study.’  Rather like 
the discussion around ethical issues, which has been reinvigorated now that archival 
researchers have drawn attention to additional ethical problems over and above those that 
were already apparent from Milgram’s own writings (Nicholson, 2011; Perry, 2012, 2013), I 
will suggest that transcribing the audio recordings anew suggests that things are even more 
complex than appears to be the case based on a reliance on Milgram’s (1974) transcripts 
alone.  As I have been able to re-transcribe a number of Milgram’s recordings as part of my 
research, it is worth exploring the relationship between the 1974 transcripts and the newer 
versions.  To do this, I will focus on one participant in particular, pseudonymized by Milgram 
as Gretchen Brandt. 
 
Gretchen Brandt 
 Gretchen Brandt’s case study is presented on pages 84-85 of Milgram’s (1974) book.  
Milgram described her as ‘an attractive thirty-one-year-old medical technician who works at 
the University Medical School.  She had emigrated from Germany five years before and 
speaks with a thick German accent’ (p. 84).3  Brandt took part in condition 20 (re-labelled 
experiment 8 in Milgram’s [1974] book), which is the only condition in which women 
participated.  In this condition, 65% (N = 26) of the 40 women who participated went all the 
way to the 450 volt switch, and were thus classified as fully obedient.  Brandt defied the 
experimenter, with the experiment being terminated after the 210 volt shock. 
Milgram presents the following excerpt from the transcript of Gretchen Brandt’s 
session: 
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1 EXPERIMENTER:  The experiment requires that 
2 you go on until he has learned all the word pairs 
3 correctly. 
4 GRETCHEN:  He has a heart condition, I’m sorry. 
5 He told you that before. 
6 EXPERIMENTER:  The shocks may be painful but 
7 they are not dangerous. 
8 GRETCHEN:  Well, I’m sorry, I think when shocks 
9 continue like this, they are dangerous.  You ask him 
10 if he wants to get out.  It’s his free will. 
11 EXPERIMENTER:  It is absolutely essential that 
12 we continue. … 
13 GRETCHEN:  I like you to ask him.  We came here 
14 of our free will.  If he wants to continue I’ll go ahead. 
15 He told you he had a heart condition.  I’m sorry.  I 
16 don’t want to be responsible for anything happening 
17 to him.  I wouldn’t like it for me either. 
18 EXPERIMENTER:  You have no other choice. 
19 GRETCHEN:  I think we here are on our own free 
20 will.  I don’t want to be responsible if he has a heart 
21 condition if anything happens to him.  Please 
22 understand that. 
(Milgram, 1974, p. 85; ellipsis in original; line numbers added) 
Using the archived audio recording of this session, it has been possible to produce an 
alternative transcription of this section of the experimental session (see also Gibson, 2013b, 
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for a different use of this same transcript).  The extract below is presented together with some 
of the interaction leading up to the start of the transcript presented in Obedience to Authority, 
with the beginning of the section of interaction which formed the basis of Milgram’s 
transcription beginning on line 8.  In this revised transcription, passages which appear in 
Milgram’s (1974) version are highlighted in order to facilitate comparison between the two 
versions.  This is necessarily somewhat approximate given that – as will be discussed below – 
some passages are re-structured in the 1974 version, meaning that while the words may be 
present in Milgram’s transcript, there are not necessarily in the right order.  As an aside, it is 
worth noting that the use of ellipsis on line 12 of Milgram’s transcript appears to indicate that 
the exchange has been edited at one specific point.  However, as the following revised 
transcript makes clear, the editorial work involved was much more extensive (for 
transcription conventions, see Appendix): 
1 T: It’s wrong.  One, two ten. 
2  ((SHOCK)) 
3 L: OW! 
4 T: Well I’m sorry, I don’t think we [should continue.] 
5 L:         [Experimenter!] 
6  Get me [out of here!  I’ve had enough and I won’t 
7  be in the experiment anymore.] 
8 E:  [The experiment requires that you go on 
9  teacher, until the learner has learned all the word  
10  pairs correctly.] 
11 T: Well he has a heart condition I’m sorry. 
12 E: Well the shocks- 
13 T: And he told you that before. 
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14 E: Right, but the shocks are not dangerous.  They 
15  may be painful- 
16 T: Well I’m sorry, I think er, shocks in, continue like 
17  this they are dangerous. 
18 E: No I can assure you they’re not dangerous.  They 
19  may be painful or, [something ((inaudible)) pain 
20  but they’re not dangerous.] 
21 T:         [Well, if he wants to-] well 
22  will you please ask him er when I’m there if he 
23  wants to get out or not.  So it’s free will I mean 
24  we’re here- 
25 E: Once we’ve started er, it’s absolutely essential we 
26  continue teacher, until he has learned all the word 
27  pairs correctly. 
28 T: Well, I’d liked you to ask him I mean we came 
29  here on our free will and you told us er, whatever 
30  happened er 
31  (2) 
32 T: I’d like you to ask him, if he [wants to continue 
33  I’ll go ahead.] 
34 E:              [Well once we’ve 
35  started I can’t] er, I can’t have any contact with 
36  the learner, other than through the microphone 
37  you see. 
38 T: Well he told you he had a heart condition I’m 
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39  sorry. 
40 E: I know [((inaudible))] 
41 T:  [And I] don’t want to be responsible for 
42  anything happen to him.  I wouldn’t like it to me 
43  here. 
44 E: You have no other choice. 
45 T: I think we’re here ah, on our free will we do have 
46  a choice. 
47 E: Well I mean that is er, i- if if you can’t continue 
48  if you won’t continue then we’ll have to, you know, 
49  just stop the experiment. 
50 T: Well, please ask him.  I won’t continue when- I’m 
51  th- I don’t want to be responsible when he has a 
52  heart condition if something happened to him. 
53 E: Well 
54 T: Please understand that. 
55 E: er we’ll have to er discontinue the experiment. 
 
For present purposes, I want to draw attention to two features of this revised transcription:  
(1) The extent to which it suggests that Milgram’s (1974) transcript under-represents 
argumentation; (2) The presence of multiple departures from standardization.  These are 
related because the under-representation of argumentation in the 1974 transcript is achieved 
in part through the ‘smoothing over’ of departures from standardization, and in turn these 
departures can themselves be understood as important features of the experimenter’s 
rhetorical toolkit. 
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As an example of the smoothing over of argumentation, consider the relatively 
straightforward exchange in lines 4-9 of the 1974 transcript, in which each speaker produces 
complete sentences.  In contrast, lines 11-17 of the revised transcript show the back-and-forth 
nature of the interaction as the experimenter tries to quickly counter the objections of Brandt.  
Notably, both Brandt and the experimenter begin their utterances on lines 11, 12, 14 and 16 
with appositional words (well, right, but) which, as Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) 
noted, are common devices for beginning a speaking turn.  These are omitted from Milgram’s 
(1974) transcript, but their presence in the revised transcript is worth dwelling on for their 
role in the back-and-forth of argumentation here. 
The appositionals in this stretch of talk can be understood as devices for seizing the 
floor of the debate.  Importantly they perform a demonstration that what has just been heard 
from the other party has been acknowledged, but that it is not satisfactory or persuasive 
(Schiffrin, 1985).  These openings thus function in such a way as to attempt to neutralize the 
rhetorical force of the preceding turn.  For example, when Brandt responds on line 11 to the 
experimenter’s prod on lines 8-10, she does not say ‘He has a heart condition’ as indicated in 
the 1974 transcript, but ‘Well he has a heart condition’.  The addition of what may seem to be 
an insignificant word, ‘well’, in fact points to some of the complexities of argumentative 
discourse.  It can be understood as a variant on the ‘yes, but’ formulation (Pomerantz, 1984), 
whereby speakers disagree politely in such a way that doesn’t involve overt rejection of an 
initial proposition.  In using ‘well’ the politeness element of the framing of the counter-
argument is perhaps minimized in comparison to ‘yes, but’, but the function is broadly 
comparable:  It serves to acknowledge receipt of the proposition, but to enable its rejection.  
The speaker is able to demonstrate that they have taken on board what their opponent in 
debate has said, but assert that their objection nevertheless still stands.  Understood in these 
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terms, ‘well’ is performing the work of a longer formulation such as ‘That’s all very well 
but…’. 
If the omission of appositionals from the 1974 transcript constitutes one way in which 
the rhetorical nature of the encounter was obscured, it is also notable that the revised 
transcript shows numerous departures from the standard form of the prods as they appear in 
Milgram’s published accounts of his method.4  Not only does this contrast with Milgram’s 
(1963, p. 374) assertion that ‘It was important to standardize the experimenter’s responses’, 
but it also highlights the fact that the non-standardized prods have been rendered in 
something more closely resembling the standard form in their presentation in Milgram’s 
(1974) transcript, although it is apparent that, even so, they are not the same as the prods as 
scripted (Darley, 1995).  It is notable that not only are prods not delivered in the standard 
form, but that the experimenter also makes attempts to respond to Brandt that are entirely 
unrelated to the content of the prods.  For example, the experimenter’s prod delivered on 
lines 8-10 departs from the standardized form in three ways: 
First, as this is the experimenter’s first prod following Brandt’s attempt to draw the 
experiment to a close on line 4, the procedure dictates that he should use prod 1 (‘Please 
continue, or, Please go on’; Milgram, 1974, p. 21).  According to Milgram’s account, the 
only conditions under which the experimenter should omit prod 1 are (a) if the participant 
‘asked if the learner was liable to suffer permanent physical injury’ (Milgram, 1974, p. 21) 
and (b) if the participant ‘said that the learner did not want to go on’ (Milgram. 1974, p. 21, 
italics in original).  In both cases, the procedure as described by Milgram allowed for prod 1 
to be replaced by one of the special prods.  However, Brandt’s attempt to stop the experiment 
at line 4 of the revised transcript (‘Well I’m sorry, I don’t think we should continue’) fails to 
satisfy either of these conditions.  Prod 1 should therefore have been used, but was not. 
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Second, the prod that is used appears to be a composite of two prods:  the second 
sequential prod (‘The experiment requires that you continue’; Milgram, 1974, p. 21), and one 
of the special prods (‘Whether the learner likes it or not, you must go on until he has learned 
all the word pairs correctly.  So please go on’; Milgram, 1974, p. 22). 
Third, it is notable that in the prod as delivered, the experimenter makes explicit the 
institutionally-relevant identities ‘teacher’ and ‘learner’.  Had the second prod been delivered 
in isolation it would have included neither of these terms, and instead referred more generally 
to the teacher as ‘you’ (‘The experiment requires that you continue’).  Had the special prod 
been delivered in isolation, only the learner would have been specified by name.  In contrast, 
by specifying the relevance of the teacher-learner relationship here (‘go on teacher, until the 
learner has learned all the word pairs’), the experimenter reminds Brandt of her 
institutionally-relevant identity, and of the obligations that come with it.  Given recent work 
on the role of identity within the experiments (Haslam, Reicher & Birney, 2014; Haslam et 
al., 2015; Reicher & Haslam, 2011; Reicher, Haslam & Smith, 2012), this can be understood 
as an attempt to avoid framing the situation in terms of personal identity (as would be implied 
had she been addressed as ‘you’) and instead to frame it in terms of a social identity provided 
by the experimenter, and more generally by the internal logic of the experiment itself.  This 
can thus be understood in terms of a rhetorical struggle over the definition of the situation, 
and of the various participants’ roles in it. 
It is also notable that whereas in the 1974 transcript the experimenter’s modified 
version of the other special prod (lines 6-7:  ‘The shocks may be painful but they are not 
dangerous’) appears on just one occasion, the revised transcript demonstrates a more complex 
attempt to convince Brandt that the punishment she is meting out does not pose a danger to 
the learner; an attempt that is made necessary by Brandt’s repeated counter-arguments.  After 
Brandt has invoked the learner’s heart condition on line 11, the experimenter responds by 
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adapting one of the special prods.  In its initiation, as noted above, the turn at lines 14-15 is 
marked as a dispreferred response (‘Right, but’).  Subsequently, the structure of the prod is 
reversed, and the phrasing is also noticeably different from that used in the published version.  
Specifically, in describing the shocks as ‘not dangerous’ rather than as leading to ‘no 
permanent tissue damage’, the experimenter avoids the implication in the latter that there may 
be some temporary tissue damage.  Simply asserting that they are not dangerous is thus a 
firmer assertion of the harmlessness of the shocks.  In reversing the order of the prod, so that 
danger is denied first and then the possibility of pain is acknowledged, the experimenter 
appears to be in the process of constructing what Antaki and Wetherell (1999) have termed a 
show concession, a rhetorically effective manoeuvre in which an assertion is followed by a 
concession, which is in turn followed by a reiteration of the original assertion.  However, the 
experimenter does not get to complete the turn and reassert the original statement as he is 
interrupted by Brandt who counters that the shocks are indeed dangerous.  Two things are of 
note here:  First, she predicates her objection on her own thoughts (line 16: ‘I think’).  In one 
sense, this move into the subjective might seem like a weaker argument, shying away as it 
does from making a straightforward factual claim.  However, insofar as one’s own subjective 
realm is beyond the reach of others, her claim to the reality of her own thoughts is much more 
difficult to challenge.  People can challenge a factual claim about the world, but a claim to 
think something or to hold a particular opinion, is much more difficult for opponents to refute 
on ontological grounds.  Second, Brandt introduces a temporal dimension to her objection – it 
is not simply the shocks that she objects to, but when ‘shocks … continue’ (line 16).  This 
upgrades the previous complaint to make relevant the ongoing nature of the shocks. 
The experimenter, however, does not move on to another prod.  Indeed, he attempts to 
reiterate the message of the same special prod again on lines 18-20.  On this occasion, the 
experimenter does complete his turn, and it does now conform to the three-part structure of a 
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show concession:  assertion (‘they’re not dangerous); concession (‘They may be painful’);  
reassertion (‘but they’re not dangerous’).  Not only is the dual use of this prod not apparent in 
the published version, but its structure as a show concession is rendered invisible. 
From line 21, Brandt then switches strategy and makes her continued participation 
contingent on the willingness of the learner to continue.  It is notable that in the 1974 
transcript this strategy is part of a series of complaints and assertions advanced by Brandt on 
lines 13-17, which also include constructions of solidarity with the learner and her own 
personal responsibility for any harm that may be caused.  In response to this, it appears that 
the experimenter simply issues a modified version of prod 4 (line 18).  However, in the 
revised transcript, the structure of the argument is much more extended and takes a rather 
different form, with Brandt only using the personal responsibility argument once her 
argument based on solidarity with the learner has been rejected by the experimenter.  First, it 
is notable that on lines 22-23 Brandt makes a direct request to the experimenter that he ask 
the learner if he wishes to continue, and that this request be made in Brandt’s presence 
(‘when I’m there’).  This request, which is not present in the 1974 transcript, is followed by 
an assertion of free will, and the experimenter responds to this with a modified combination 
of prod 3 and one of the special prods (lines 25-27).  As with the earlier modified prod on 
lines 8-10, this features a direct invocation of Brandt’s institutionally-relevant identity 
(‘teacher’), thus serving as a reminder of her role in the experiment. 
In her response, it is notable (again) that Brandt uses an appositional (line 26: ‘well’) 
to initiate her turn, followed by an assertion of free will which is presented in solidarity with 
the learner:  Brandt asserts that ‘we came here on our free-will’ rather than the possible 
alternative ‘I came here on my free-will’.  Thus Brandt constructs a group identity for herself 
and the learner in (implied) opposition to the experimenter.  She then trails off, and a two 
second silence ensues (line 31).  As the experimenter fails to fill this silence, Brandt reasserts 
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her request that the experimenter ask the learner ‘if he wants to continue’, and makes her own 
continued participation conditional on the learner’s.  The experimenter’s response on lines 
34-37 is not self-evidently related to any of the scripted prods, and instead is specifically 
tailored to provide a reason why he cannot act on Brandt’s request.  It is formulated as a 
general rule prohibiting him from going to speak to the learner (‘I can’t’).  The final ‘you see’ 
marks this turn as having imparted new information that explains his unwillingness to take 
the course of action requested by Brandt, in effect displaying the turn as one which reveals an 
institutional rule of which Brandt had hitherto been unaware.  In other words, ‘you see’ 
implies that previously, you didn’t see.5  It is only following this that Brandt moves on to an 
argument based around her own personal responsibility (lines 41-42), predicated on the fact 
that ‘he told you he had a heart condition’ (line 38).  She also explicitly refers to how she 
would not like to be in the learner’s position.  So, what appears to be a list-like succession of 
arguments on lines 13-17 of the 1974 transcript appears quite differently in the revised 
transcript.  In contrast, they are made in response to (and in anticipation) of various counter-
claims made by the experimenter.  In the 1974 transcript, the back-and-forth nature of the 
way in which these arguments are advanced is neglected, and in the removal of the 
Experimenter’s turns there is no evidence of him having responded specifically to the request 
to ask the learner if he wishes to continue.  The smoothing over of argumentation thus also 
goes hand-in-hand with the obscuring of a departure from standardization involving the use 
of a ‘prod’ that does not appear in the published accounts of Milgram’s methodology. 
Subsequently, the experimenter issues a version of the fourth prod.  In the 1974 
transcript, this occurs on line 18 (‘You have no other choice.’)  Brandt then responds to this 
on lines 19-22 by asserting that ‘we here are on our own free will’ and that she does not wish 
to be responsible for any negative consequences for the learner given that he has a heart 
condition.  This is all reproduced without any intervention from the experimenter.  In 
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contrast, the revised transcript includes a substantial turn from the experimenter (lines 47-49) 
as well as a brief attempt to initiate a turn on line 53.  In his extended turn, the experimenter 
departs from the script in such a way as to back-track from the stark assertion of the absence 
of choice.  Rather than calling the experiment to a halt as soon as Brandt has maintained her 
defiance on lines 45-46, the experimenter clarifies that lack of choice in practice means 
simply that the experiment will have to be stopped.  This can be seen as a final attempt to 
remind the participant of the importance of the experiment, and of her role in it, although 
ultimately it fails (as it did on other occasions on which it was used; see Gibson, 2013a).  
Ultimately, this highlights (a) the extent to which questioning of the experimenter could lead 
to the withdrawal of prod 4, and (b) the further removal of a notable departure from 
standardization in the 1974 transcript. 
 
Discussion 
 In undertaking a detailed analysis of a single extract, the aim of the present paper has 
been twofold:  First, to illustrate the key findings concerning the rhetorical nature of the 
experimental encounter, and the extent to which the experimenter departed from the 
standardized script; and second to draw attention to the utility of the archived audio 
recordings for changing how we might understand the Milgram experiments.  In particular, 
the difference between Milgram’s (1974) transcript and my revised version highlights both 
the potential and, as I will argue in this concluding section, the ambiguities of archival data. 
 As Derrida (1995) reminds us, the origin of the word ‘archive’ comes from the Greek 
arkhē, and arkheion: 
Initially a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the 
archons, those who commanded.  The citizens who thus held and signified political 
power were considered to possess the right to make or to represent the law.  On 
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account of their publicly recognized authority, it is at their home, in that place which 
is their house … that official documents are filed.  The archons are first of all the 
documents’ guardians. … They have the power to interpret the archives.  Entrusted to 
such archons, these documents in effect state the law. 
(Derrida, 1995, pp. 9-10, italics in original) 
This highlights the extent to which the nature of archives has always been bound up with the 
exercise – and location – of power.  This raises many issues, but I want to focus here on just 
one:  the archive itself can be used as a powerful warranting device.  At their most trivial, 
debates over interpretation can become debates about who has spent longest in the archives, 
who has sifted through the most documents, or listened to the most recordings.  Less 
superficially, all research which self-consciously addresses itself to archival data can – often 
with good reason – find itself in the position of using the archives to reveal what was 
previously hidden.  The analysis outlined in the present paper can be seen as just such an 
exercise, and while readers will be the judge of the utility or otherwise of the exercise, there 
is a wider issue here of treating archives as simply showing in an unmediated way that which 
was previously obscured.  It is precisely this tendency which Byford and Tileagă (2014) 
criticise in their discussion of interdisciplinary ‘borrowing’ when they highlight the way in 
which Neitzel and Welzer (cited in Byford & Tileagă, 2014) use recently discovered 
recordings of German prisoners of war during World War II.  Neitzel and Welzer treat these 
as straightforward insights into what the speakers ‘really thought’, in contrast to other forms 
of communication (e.g. letters) which are treated as inevitably compromised insofar as they 
are constructed for a particular purpose.  The recorded conversations are thus seen as offering 
an unmediated window onto how speakers really experienced the war. 
 When one comes across an archive as rich as the PoW transcripts or the Milgram 
recordings, the initial reaction may be ‘Aha! Now we can see what really happened, what 
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they really thought’.  But this involves a problematic suspension of critical judgement.  As 
noted above, making sense of archival data will always be an interpretative process.  That is 
not to say that all interpretations will be equally valid – as Byford and Tileagă (2014, p. 350) 
note, we have at our disposal the powerful tools of ‘good old-fashioned scholarly debate’ – 
but it does mean that if we treat archival data as the naked truth, we risk repeating the 
scholarly errors of the past.  And by errors, I mean not the ‘inaccurate’ rendering of ‘bad’ 
transcription, but rather the over-confident presentation of a particular version of something 
as the definitive and ultimately real version.  In this respect, it is not so much that Milgram 
produced inaccurate transcripts, but that given the dominant psychological assumptions about 
language at the time Milgram was working – in which language itself was conceived as a 
fairly transparent medium for the communication of thoughts from one mind to another – 
there is no reason why Milgram should really have been concerned with capturing anything 
more than the gist of the conversation.  Milgram was working at a time when the mass 
availability of audio recording technology was in its infancy, and despite the fact that during 
the period when Milgram was writing Obedience to Authority, on the other side of North 
America Harvey Sacks was in the early stages of using audio records to develop what became 
known as conversation analysis, much qualitative research still relied on field notes – written 
records capturing summaries of what participants had said.  Rather, for Milgram’s illustrative 
purposes, his transcripts were good enough, just as for Sacks – despite the partial nature of 
audio recording – his tapes were ‘good enough’ (Sacks, 1984, p. 26) for his purposes. 
 However, suggesting that no single representation of what happened can provide the 
ultimate truth on the matter is not to suggest that all interpretations are equally valid.  One of 
the features of ‘good old-fashioned scholarly debate’ is that scholars argue for things to be 
apprehended and made sense of in particular ways, and these arguments are informed by 
conceptual frameworks and philosophical assumptions.  The argument that my rendering of 
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the Brandt transcript allows us to apprehend what went on in Milgram’s experiments in a new 
and interesting way is part of a broader set of arguments concerning the best way to 
conceptualize the role of language within the social psychology laboratory, and ultimately 
concerning the best way of conceptualizing language itself within the discipline.  It is thus 
part of a broader movement away from the idea that language is a simple reflection of 
thought towards a position which sees language as active, constructive and functional.  Such 
arguments are still live concerns within the discipline, with the majority of experimental 
research continuing to adopt what Reddy (1979) termed the ‘conduit’ metaphor of language 
as providing a relatively straightforward insight into thought.  One particularly pertinent 
recent example of such an assumption can be found in Burger, Girgis and Manning’s (2011) 
analysis of participants’ comments in Burger’s (2009) partial replication of Milgram’s 
paradigm.  Burger et al (2011, p. 461) argue that ‘[b]ecause the spontaneous comments came 
without prompting and because participants were unlikely to have anticipated that these 
comments would be analyzed by the investigators, the comments provide a unique and 
relatively uncensored glimpse into what participants were thinking as they moved through the 
experimental procedures’.  Such assumptions are difficult to sustain once we take seriously 
the insights of discursive and rhetorical approaches which highlight that people are never 
simply reporting their thoughts when they speak, but are always actively engaged in doing 
something.  For present purposes, it is important to note that it is this conceptual framework, 
as much as the archives themselves, which acts as the warrant for the claims concerning 
Milgram’s experiments.  Essentially, the archives do not simply ‘show’ us that rhetoric is 
under-represented in Milgram’s transcripts and interpretations, they have to be made to show 
this. 
For this reason, I want to return to the issue of the relationship between transcripts and 
archives.  Part of my argument here has indeed been to use a new transcription, based on the 
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archived audio recording, of the Gretchen Brandt extract presented by Milgram (1974), to 
‘show’ things that were previously hidden from view:  both the rhetorical nature of the 
experimental interaction, and the experimenter’s departures from the standardized script are 
under-represented in Milgram’s transcript.  Such an exercise is, I have argued, useful and 
illuminating.  But we might be wise to be cautious of extending the visual metaphor here.  
Being able to show things that were previously hidden from view, or to illuminate such that 
we might see more clearly, is problematic if it is taken to imply that we now see things as 
they really are, unmediated, unrepresented, unconstructed.  Milgram’s transcripts served his 
purpose, my transcripts serve mine; my theoretical perspective on language necessitates one 
sort of transcript, his necessitated another.  Rather than simply enabling us to see what was 
previously obscured, we might instead say that we see differently.  Rather than bringing light 
where once there was darkness, it is simply that such a transcription allows us to see things in 
a different light, or, for those who may be less convinced of the utility of my approach, in a 
different darkness.  The idea that my revised transcription represents the ‘real’ nature of the 
interaction, or the ‘best’ way of representing it, is problematic.  Conversation analysts would 
undoubtedly point to my use of a very simplified form of Jeffersonian transcription.  The use 
of commas to represent pauses, instead of the conventional (.) symbol; the absence of 
markers of rising intonation, in-breaths and so on, might be taken to indicate a lack of interest 
in the rigours of transcription required for interactional analysis.  Others may go further and 
produce transcripts which more closely abide by such conventions in order to offer novel 
insights on the nature of the experiments at an even finer-grained level of detail (Hollander, 
2015).  Transcribing at this level of detail would be well-suited to conversation analytic 
purposes, and might appear to be a ‘better’ or more ‘real’ representation of what went on, but 
it wouldn’t be long before arguments were advanced that in transcribing to this level of detail, 
we focus our analytic attention at the wrong level:  the detail of interaction rather than the 
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content of what was said (for a relevant debate, see Potter & Hepburn, 2005a, b; Smith, 
Hollway & Mishler, 2005).  In arguing that we should pay closer attention to the archived 
recordings, then, someone else can always come along and suggest that we should pay even 
closer attention (or, in the spirit of tape fetishism, that we could if only we had more 
complete recordings); or indeed they might contest what it means to pay ‘close’ attention by 
suggesting that we are attending to the wrong thing.  If such debates get bogged down in who 
has captured the recordings most faithfully, then we are heading down an epistemological 
blind alley.  The key questions are, rather, ones of function:  what framework and 
assumptions is one bringing to the data, and what form of transcription is suitable for one’s 
purposes?  This is a fairly familiar line of argument from the literature on transcription, and 
as such I won’t labor the point further.  However, I would argue that the same essential point 
applies to our engagement with archives.  Indeed, given the extent to which transcription 
forms a central part of much qualitative research, it is likely to be closely bound up with how 
we use archives; nevertheless, when applied to archives, the point concerns broader issues 
than transcription alone.  In using archival data, we have to make decisions about what 
materials to use, how to represent those materials for the purposes of analysis and 
dissemination, and how to treat the ontological status of those materials. 
Indeed, any suggestion that the materials themselves are static is problematic.  
Though Stanley Milgram died in 1984, his archive is alive and well in its continuing 
transformation.  Derrida (1995) speculated on how new technologies might have transformed 
archives had they been available at the time the materials were being produced (his example 
concerns what might have been the case if Freud had had access to email technology).  But 
technological shifts not only change what can be archived, they are constantly changing the 
nature of extant archives.  In digitising textual material and making it searchable online, 
archives are not only making this usable in new ways but they are transforming the nature of 
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the materials themselves.  In Milgram’s case, the archive is transformed from a place which a 
researcher has to visit, to one containing materials that can be copied and delivered to 
researchers (myself included) who may never set foot in the physical archives themselves.  In 
this respect, while the reasons for the growth of interest in the Milgram archives in recent 
years are undoubtedly complex, it is arguable that a key issue concerns the comparatively 
recent development of technologies which allow researchers to make use of the materials.  
An archival sensibility is, thus, a two-sided affair balancing a curiosity for what archives can 
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Appendix 
In the revised transcript, speakers are identified as E (Experimenter), T (Teacher) and L 
(Learner).  Other transcription conventions are as follows: 
OW! Capitals indicate utterances that are noticeably louder than the surrounding 
talk.  Exclamation marks indicate increased urgency in the delivery of the 
utterance. 
(2) Numbers in parentheses indicate a timed silence, with the number indicating 
the amount in seconds. 
I can’t, I A comma indicates a pause of less than a second. 
I- A dash indicates a sharp cut-off of the preceding utterance. 
[continue] Brackets indicate overlapping talk. 
volts. A full-stop (period) indicates a ‘stopping’ intonation, rather than the end of a 
grammatical sentence per se. 
Why? A question mark indicates a questioning intonation, rather than a grammatical 
question per se. 
((inaudible)) Double parentheses indicate comments from the transcriber. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 There is good reason to be cautious of this seemingly innocent characterization of the experiments as being 
concerned with ‘obedience’.  Recent research has suggested that, whatever the experiments do show, they are 
not examples of people obeying direct orders (Burger, Girgis & Manning, 2011; Gibson, 2013a; Reicher & 
Haslam, 2011). 
2




 It is notable that none of the male participants are described in terms of their level of attractiveness.  
4
 In fact there are inconsistencies in Milgram’s published descriptions of the prods, with the account in his 1965 
Human Relations article diverging in some important respects from that presented in his 1963 article in Journal 
of Abnormal & Social Psychology and his 1974 book (see Gibson, 2013b, pp. 179-180 for a fuller comparison). 
5
 This is a somewhat different approach to dealing with similar requests to that adopted by the experimenter in 
an earlier experimental condition (see Gibson, 2013b). 
